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Justifying pension reforms: Comparing 




The latest UK and Norwegian state pension reforms have reflected contrasting policy design 
in the balance of private pensions, savings and state provision. Nevertheless, we argue both 
governments have in many ways adopted strikingly similar approaches in seeking public 
acceptance of these potentially controversial reforms, employing a similar repertoire of 
discursive elements to persuade their populations about their logic and rationality. Based on 
critical analysis of government policy papers, speeches and parliamentary debates, we find 
both countries emphasise ‘sustainability’ and 'fairness' within an increasingly individualised 
context where both systems are characterized as facilitating individuals’ efforts to attain 
security in retirement through ‘choice’ or ‘flexibility’. Significantly, contrasting symbolic 
metaphors are adopted to situate these reforms, and their proponents, within the heritage and 
traditions of their different welfare systems, which we find is a key element in successfully 
implementing the reforms. We note the implications of this research for the analysis of 
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In the past decade, the adequacy and sustainability of public and private pension provision has 
been a key issue for nation states across Europe (European Commission, 2018; HLG, 2019). 
The fiscal demands of the coronavirus pandemic (Di Feliciantonio, 2020) have only 
compounded the budgetary challenges of population ageing and shrinking workforces. 
As a result, governments have faced, and will continue to face, the dilemma of seeking 
retrenchment in state-sponsored pension spending whilst avoiding claims of 
intergenerational unfairness. In most cases to date, the result has been incremental, 
parametric reductions in levels of pension provision (European Commission, 2018).  
 
So how have governments justified these reforms so far? In seeking to address this question 
we examine the importance of discursive regimes, following the influential work of Schmidt, 
who argues that an important element in reforming welfare states is the “ability to legitimate 
the economic adjustments and institutional adaptations by way of public discourse” (2000: 
278). This discourse, according to Schmidt, should differ across countries due to different 
contexts, pressures and differences in the relevant actors that must be convinced. We therefore 
adopt a comparative case study examining how the UK and Norway have addressed the 
challenges of state pension reform. These countries have been selected because of their 
contrasting institutional pension structures and different welfare state typologies as defined by 
Esping-Andersen (1990). Norway represents the social-democratic welfare system and the 
United Kingdom the liberal welfare system.   
 
Comparing Norway and the UK, implies contrasting two different pension systems. The 
public British system was and is directed towards protecting against poverty in old age (basic 
security, the Beveridge model) rather than securing income standard security as in continental 
Europe (e.g. the Bismarckian model of Germany) (Hinrich & Lynch, 2010). The public 
pension system in Norway, Folketrygden (National insurance) has in contrast, since the 
introduction of income related pensions in 1967, aimed at combining basic and standard 
security, or in other words combining Bismarck and Beveridge. The contained public 
responsibility in the British system, has strengthened the role of occupational pensions and 
private market-based arrangements for income security in the British pension system (Bridgen 
& Meyer, 2011). The strong dominance of public pensions in Norway has reduced the scope 




A simple way to illustrate this is to have a look at replacement rates, which tells us the share 
of previous earnings that an individual receives as pension in retirement. The figures in 
Table 1 indicate some important aspects of the functioning of the two pension systems 
previous to the pension reforms: 
 
Table 1: Net replacement rates of public pensions at various lifetime earnings levels in 
2004 
 




2 times average lifetime 
earnings 
Norway 77 % 69 % 55 % 
United 
Kingdom 
66 % 41 % 24 % 
Source: Hinrich & Lynch, 2010: 358, table 24.1. The net replacement rate measures pension entitlements as a 
share (percentage) of net pre-retirement earnings, net of income taxes and social security contributions paid by 
workers and pensioners. Calculations (based on the OECD pension modelling) assume a full- time career from 
age 20 to standard retirement age. Pensions include public pensions and quasi-mandatory private sector 
pensions. 
 
This composition of different pension institutions expresses in historical context different 
policy ideas and broader welfare state philosophies of the two countries: In the British and 
liberal welfare state tradition limited public resources should be targeted at those most in need 
to reduce poverty, and additional income needs ought to be left to the individual and his/her 
own decision on saving and choice of a suitable level of living in old age. Thus, voluntarism 
is key in the British pension system (Bridgen & Mayer, 2011). The Norwegian tradition 
expresses a wider state responsibility for welfare in line with what is known as the social 
democratic, Scandinavian or encompassing welfare model (Esping-Andersen, 1990). Here, 
public resources are used to reach beyond fighting poverty to ensure income inequalities in 
old age are lower than in working life (Pedersen, 1999).  
 
We conduct a critical investigation of government policy papers, speeches and 
parliamentary debates over the periods 2001-2009 (Norway) and 2004-2013 (UK). By 
undertaking a form of directed content analysis of policy documents (see Hsieh and Shannon 
2005), identifying the key concepts forming the basis of our discursive analysis, we are able 
to derive intensity scores for those concepts. The scores indicate the number of times each 
concept is used in a document as a percentage of the number of pages in that document. We 
treat this as a proxy of the importance of a concept in the discursive narrative of that 
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document. This enables us to characterise and compare the discursive narratives employed in 
each country in attempting to implement state pension reform. 
 
Despite their differences, we find similarities between the two countries in what 
Schmidt refers to as the ideational dimensions of discourse. Specifically, the reforms in both 
countries harness elements of discourse embedded in attempts to address demographic and 
economic structural stresses, as well as increasingly influential privatising and individualising 
pressures, experienced by states across Europe (European Commission, 2012).  However, as 
Schmidt points out: “Good ideas alone …. are not enough. They must be translated into a 
common language accessible to the larger public that can serve as the basis for a discourse 
capable of convincing citizens of the appropriateness and legitimacy of change” (2000:285). 
We find that there are both differences and similarities in what Schmidt refers to as the 
interactive dimension of discourse. Both countries emphasise ‘sustainability’ and 'fairness' 
within an increasingly individualised context where both systems are characterized as 
facilitating individuals’ efforts to attain security in retirement through ‘choice’ or ‘flexibility’. 
Significantly, contrasting symbolic metaphors are adopted to situate these reforms, and their 
proponents, within the heritage and traditions of their different welfare systems, which we 
find is a key element in successfully implementing the reforms. We thus add to literature on 
pension reform and security as well as the important question about how governments try to 
gain public acceptance of potentially controversial reforms to pension systems (see, for 
example, Belfrage, 2015 and Bridgen and Meyer, 2018). 
The next section contextualises, and further justifies, our comparison of Norway and 
the UK. Thereafter, section three outlines Schmidt’s theoretical perspective and its relevance 
for our work. Section four briefly outlines data and sources. The main analysis of the pension 
reform discourses of the two countries is provided in section five. Section six provides a 
discussion and conclusion.  
 
2. Case selection 
Whilst there are similarities in the issues Norway and the UK were attempting to address, 
their pension systems rested on very different degrees of state responsibility.  
As illustrated in Table 1, prior to the reforms examined, the two countries revealed 
fundamentally different approaches. Norway, combined a fairly generous minimum pension 
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with an earnings-related element aimed at securing moderate living standards (within an 
income ceiling) in old age through a PAYG system (cf. Pedersen, 2011 for an elaboration). In 
the UK a below subsistence level, flat rate pension was supplemented by some additional 
earnings-related second state pension (cf. Seeleib-Kaiser, 2013) and means tested benefits.  
 
Unsurprisingly, this resulted in very different outcomes for the then current, and predicted 
future, public spending on state pensions1: 
 
Table 2: Current and future direct public old age pension spending pre and post reform: 
Share of GDP, 2000, 2050 
 2000 2050 
Pre-reform spending   
Norway 5,9 15,2 
UK 4,3 7,7 
Post- reform spending   
Norway 5,9 12,0-12,5 
UK 4,3 7,7 
Source: NOU 2004:1, Table 3.4, p. 52; Pensions Policy Institute, 2014, Chart 3 
 
In Table 2 we see that in 2000, prior to reforms in either country, relative spending was higher 
for Norway than for the UK, and was predicted to increase significantly, putting Norway 
above the OECD spending average (NOU 2004:1, p. 52). For the UK public spending was 
also expected to increase but predicted to be at a substantially lower level than for Norway. 
Post- reform spending predicted for 2050 would reduce Norwegian public spending figures by 
around 3 percentage points. As regards the UK, it was expected that, despite anticipated 
demographic pressures, state pension spending as at 2050 would be broadly similar pre- and 
post- 2016 reform (although it was argued that taking into account increased National 
Insurance contribution receipts resulting from the abolition of the contracting out element of 
the State Second Pension would mean that the reforms generated substantial savings) 
(Pensions Policy Institute, 2014).   
 
Norway and the UK are therefore good cases to compare.  Both pension systems have faced 
demographic and economic cost pressures.  However, their welfare state typologies, 
institutional structures and levels of provision, differ significantly.  Thus, we might expect 
                                                 
1 The figures reported in Table 2 are public direct expenditures on public pensions. However, they show only 
part of public efforts towards pensions as the role of public tax expenditures or fiscal welfare are not accounted 
for. Taking this into account would increase spending figures, particularly for the UK. Moreover, including 
private spending and occupational pension spending would provide a more complete picture of the overall gross 




differences in the discourse used in each country to successfully introduce reforms that would 
otherwise be controversial to voters and interest organizations (cf. Immergut and Abou-Chadi, 
2014). Considering their approaches to gaining acceptance of state pension reforms, and in 
particular seeking reduction in state pension expenditures, allows us to assess the possible 
implications for other governments implementing similar reforms.  
 
3. Theoretical perspective: the need for convincing discourse 
The importance of pensions in the welfare state edifices of both Norway and the UK is well 
documented (Bjørnson, 2001: 212; Barr, 2001). Pension institutions are not simply technical 
vehicles providing income streams; they encapsulate notions of fairness and distributive 
justice. Consequently, successful reform requires influential interest groups and the general 
public to be convinced of both the justification for, and effectiveness of, any proposed 
reforms.  
 These concerns tap into the central dimensions and functions of discourse discussed in 
Schmidt’s account of the nature of discourse (2000: 277-290). According to Schmidt, public 
discourse is defined as:  
 
the sum of political actors’ public accounts of the polity’s purposes, goals and ideals 
which serve to explain political events, to justify political actions, to develop political 
identities, to reshape and/or reinterpret political history, and, all in all, to frame the 
national political discussion (2000: 279). 
 
Schmidt examines the challenges of globalization and Europeanization for national policy 
elites in reforming national economies, and highlights the importance of discourse in 
legitimising reforms (2000: 279). Following Schmidt, we analyse the role of discourse in 
legitimising changes in national pensions policy.  
Schmidt distinguishes between two central dimensions of discourse: the ideational and 
the interactive. Table 3 below summarises these discursive dimensions and their functions in 
Schmidt’s analytic account: 
 
Table 3. The dimensions and functions of discourse 
Dimensions Ideational  
The internal standard and content/building 
blocks of policy paradigms/programmes 
Interactive  




for the necessity 
Normative 
Providing  arguments 
for the value 
Coordinative 
Providing a common 
language to frame 
Communicative 
Providing a convincing 






effectiveness of a 
policy programme 
appropriateness  and 
legitimacy of a policy 
programme  
and construct a 
consensual policy 
programme among 
relevant policy elites 
policy programme that 
gains acceptance and 
possibly adherence in 
the public at large 
 
The ideational dimension of discourse requires a policy programme providing good reasons 
for its implementation and that is appropriate, in as much as it aligns with national values. Its 
cognitive function demonstrates why the proposed policy programme is superior to the 
present one; correctly identifying the problem at hand, providing the goals to be achieved, and 
pinpointing the means and instruments to be deployed. Its normative function legitimates the 
policy programme by attempting to connect it to entrenched values and national identity, 
demonstrating how the new ideas of the proposed policy programme are in keeping with those 
values and identity.  
 Through its interactive dimension, discourse facilitates consensus for a policy 
programme among policy elites, whilst reaching out more broadly to convince the larger 
public. Its coordinative function employs “a common language and ideational framework 
through which key policy groups seek to come to agreement about a policy paradigm” 
(Schmidt, 2000: 285). Its communicative function is the means by which policy elites 
convincingly convey the ideational framework, through that common language. 
Schmidt (2000: 286), argues that the need for a broadly convincing ideational 
framework is more important in ‘consensual’ countries where power is dispersed amongst 
governmental elites, political opposition and interest groups – a characteristic displayed in 
Norway, as opposed to countries where a ‘majoritarian’ “government-centred policy elite” 
dominates with high power concentration (e.g. the UK). As a result, and following Schmidt’s 
analysis (2000: 293), we would expect a need for the ideational framework to draw more 
upon traditionally accepted notions of social justice and solidarity in Norwegian pension 
reform discourse and for the co-ordinative element of discourse to be key in seeking to 
successfully enlist a dispersed range of interests. By contrast, in the case of the UK, one might 
expect that systemic reforms would more easily be adopted by a narrower policy elite, with 
the greater challenge for the communicative aspect of discourse as a narrower policy elite 
seeks to convince the wider general public of the merits of its reforms. Moreover, we should 
expect a different reform discourse in countries where public responsibility for social justice 
is institutionalized, as in Norway, compared to countries where individual responsibility is 
more firmly established, as in the UK. In sum, this implies that we should see different 




4. Data and methods 
Our approach to the choice of documentation and its analysis reflects the two different 
forms of democratic approach examined in this paper, i.e. the consensual model for Norway, 
and the majoritarian approach in the UK (Schmidt, 2011: 59).  In both cases, we undertake 
documentary analysis of the key documents setting out their cognitive and normative 
approaches to reform.  In the case of Norway, taking account of the significance of the co-
ordinative dimension of discourse arising from our Norway’s consensual model of politics, 
we also examine parliamentary debates. We thus focus on the period 2001-2009 as this 
includes preparatory work by the government and the commission it appointed, as well as 
main parliamentary debates leading to the reform in 2009. In the case of the UK, after briefly 
outlining the reasons for the failure of the UK’s 1998 pension reforms, we use Schmidt’s 
framework to examine policy documents in the two episodes of pension reform in 2004-6 and 
2010-13 that ultimately led to the reformed state pension now in place in the UK.   
 
Table 4: Key documents  
           Norway                                                                  UK 
Year Key documents Year Key documents 
2001 St.meld.nr.30 Langtidsprogrammet 2002-
2005, ch. 15: Et solidarisk og bærekraftig 
pensjonssystem 
1998 A new contract for welfare: PARTNERSHIP IN PENSIONS 
(Department of Social Security) 
2004 NOU 2004:1 Modernisert folketrygd – 
Bærekraftig pensjon for framtida 
2004 Pensions: Challenges and Choices 
The First Report of the Pensions Commission (Pensions 
Commission) 
2004 St.meld, nr 12 (2004-2005) pensjonsreform 
– trygghet for pensjonene 
2006 Implementing an integrated package of pension reforms: 
The Final Report of the Pensions Commission (Pensions 
Commission) 
2005 Vedtak 354 2006 Security in retirement: towards a new pensions system 
(Department for Work and Pensions) 
2006 St.meld. nr 5 (2006-2007) sak nr. 1, 
Innstilling fra arbeids- og sosialkomiteen 
om opptjening og uttak av alderspensjon 
i folketrygden.. 
2010 A sustainable State Pension: when the State Pension age will 
increase to 66 (Department for Work and Pensions) 
2007 Vedtak nr 406 on the basis of Innst. S. nr. 
168 (2006-2007) 
2011  A state pension for the 21st century (Department for Work and 
Pensions) 
 
2008 Stoltenberg II gov, proposal for new old 
age pension 
2013  The single-tier pension:  
a simple foundation for saving (Department for Work and 
Pensions) 
2009 Ot.prop. nr. 37 (2008-2009) Om lov om 





Table 4 sets out the key documents analysed. The sample of Norwegian documents is based 
on the website www.pensjonsreform.no (Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs), which lists 
all public documents concerning pension reform. In addition, we have included a White Paper 
from 2001 (St.meld 2001) not mentioned on the website. Translations from Norwegian into 
English are made by the authors of this article. As regards the UK, the relevant Government 
white and green pension reform papers, which proposed and then set out in detail the UK 
coalition’s state pension reforms in 2010-13 are analysed. In the earlier period of 2004-2006, 
the Pensions Commission publications establishing the analysis and framework upon which 
those subsequent reforms rest are included in the analysis alongside the subsequent White 
paper of 2006 setting out Labour’s reforms. Whilst these documents do not encapsulate 
every pronouncement of the respective governments on state pension issues, they include 
all of the main policy documents upon which the reforms are based. 
As noted above, we conduct a form of directed content analysis by using intensity 
scores for key words identified in the two reform processes. The returns of these key 
word searches are presented in figures 1-5. This approach provides a measure of the 
importance of these elements of discourse, and can be contrasted with other approaches 
to discourse analysis which emphasise the role of interpretation (see Glynos et al., 2009). 
To enhance the validity of the content analysis, and to address any criticism that the 
intensity scores are an artefact of the documents themselves, the key words are 
identified based on a careful reading and re-reading of the documents in the context of 
Schmidt’s analytical framework, and agreed by the researchers. To ensure that 
occurrences are not underreported we recognise that words may be written differently 
and so we search for the stem of words. On the other hand, we avoid over-reporting by 
omitting returns due to key words appearing in tables of content, lists of references, 
notes or headers of documents; words being similar, but with totally different meanings 
(e.g. utvalg [commission] when searching for valg [choice]); or selected words being used 
in a context which does not specifically refer to the pensions issues under analysis 
(Weber, 1990).  Interviews with key actors on how governments justify reforms could 
have further strengthened the validity of our analysis but was not possible in this 
project. Norway and the UK were examined to contrast differing welfare regimes, 
although we recognise that the generalisability of our results might be improved by 




5. Pension reform discourses  
Norway – the ideational dimension 
Applying our analysis to the Norwegian pension reform process, we start with the cognitive 
and normative functions of discourse as expressed in two central documents establishing the 
key principles of Norwegian reforms: the White Paper (long term programme) presenting 
pension challenges and mandating a pension commission be appointed (St. meld. nr. 30, 
2001); and the Green Paper (official Norwegian report) on a modernised national insurance 
scheme developed by the independent commission (NOU, 2004: 1). Sustainability was a 
key concept in explaining the problems of the system and establishing a goal for reform (see 
Figures 1 and 2). It was understood, first and foremost, as economic sustainability; that 
financial demands do not overburden the economy or taxpayers now or in the future: “a 
system with a close to equal distribution of benefits and burdens between generations over 
time” (NOU, 2004: 1:92). 
Cognitively, increasing longevity and a worsening old age dependency ratio were 
identified as challenges concerning generational distribution (See Figures 1 and 2) (NOU, 
2004: 1: 10, 45-65 and 103-107). The traditional way of meeting these financial challenges in 
Norway has been increasing taxes. However, the Commission set out why such a policy path 
was problematic and to be avoided (NOU, 2004: 1: 104-107). It argued that a good pension 
system is not judged on the ‘headline’ pension figure but upon having secure financing over 
time, which it argued required limiting expenditure in the context of substantial long-term 
austerity needed for the economy as a whole. This is reflected in the intensity of the use of the 
concept of ‘sustainability’ and ‘generational distribution’ in the policy documents (see 
Figures 1 and 2). It was argued that in a PAYG system tax increases may reduce the support 
among the working age population and the intergenerational understanding upon which the 
system rests. This argument served an important normative function (cf. Schmidt, 2000: 281) 
and is reflected in the intensity scores for both generational distribution and justice/fairness in 








The Commission also stressed that no other countries had relied on tax increases as a 
reform strategy; instead increasing state pension age, reducing pension expenditures, and 
reducing public responsibility. Thus, the choices made by other countries, framed reform 
options for Norway: 
 
“There are limits to how much higher tax levels in Norway may be compared to other 
countries, if serious consequences for Norwegian business life are to be avoided. The 
Pension Commission has therefore decided to disregard a general tax increase as a 















Figure 1: Intensity scores for keywords, 
documents 2001-2004 
NOU 2004:1 St.meld 2001













Figure 2: Intensity scores for keywords, 
documents 2004-2006  
St.meld 2006 St.meld 2004
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Moving from the problem description to policy solutions, a key element was to strengthen and 
clarify the relationship between individual contributions and pension benefits. Moreover, the 
retrenchment reform of public pensions also increased the importance of occupational 
pensions in securing future retirement income (cf. Pedersen, Hippe, Grødem & 
Sørensen, 2018: 116). 
As noted by Schmidt (2000: 281) discursive transformation may take place by 
invoking the past, building on long established values. In Norway, the reforms were portrayed 
as a form of ‘restoration’ of the original distributive idea of national insurance. In the two 
parliamentary debates following the Green Paper, the intensity of the use of the concepts of 
justice/fairness and security was ramped up (contrast Figures 1 and 2 with Figure 3) as 
advocates of the reforms characterised them as being in the spirit and tradition of the ground-




* Search for ‘responsibility’ include in addition to individual responsibility also divisions of 
responsibility between public, occupational and private pension provision pillars. For the 
parliamentary debates (St.forh 2005, 2007) responsibility had high intensity score, but 
referred almost exclusively to questions of (not) taking political responsibility. These returns 
are not included in our intensity score in figure 3. 
** Search for the term ‘choice’ included reference to ‘freedom of choice’, ‘choice 
opportunities’, ‘individual choice opportunities’ and ‘investment choice’  
 
 
The normative idea of individual responsibility, through a stronger proportional link 
between contributions and benefits, also emphasised the connection between labour market 













Figure 3: Intensity scores for keywords, 
documents 2005-2007 
St.forh 2007 St.forh 2005
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success and pension outcomes and underpinned parliamentary debates concerning increasing 
longevity and building security, sustainability and generational fairness (see Figure 3). 
Individuals had a choice: extend their working life and delay retirement or disregard increased 
longevity and face a permanently lower replacement level.  
The solution was to replace a fixed retirement age (67) with a flexible one (62-75), 
strengthening the link between contributions and pension benefits, and to introduced the main 
retrenchment element of the reform: life expectancy divisors. At the time of retirement, the 
annual pension would be calculated by dividing accumulated pension entitlement by a life 
expectancy divisor based on cohort life expectancy (OECD, 2015: 316). A flexible pension 
age allowed individuals to work longer to compensate for increased life expectancy, or to take 
(lower) pension benefits from an earlier date. The solution was presented as allowing 
individuals to make decisions - choices - in accordance with their personal circumstances. 
Flexibility and choice were therefore key themes in both the White and Green Papers on 
pension reform (see Figures 1 and 2), as well as forming a key element in building a 
consensus in parliamentary debates (see Figure 3).  
In sum, cognitive ideas focusing on longevity, economic sustainability and 
generational distribution formed the salient aspects of the problem. Normatively, the existing 
system was deemed unfair. Policy solutions addressed longevity and sustainability and 
emphasised flexibility, choice, and individual responsibility, which were framed as being 
within the long-standing traditions of the pension system. 
Norway - the interactive dimension 
A broad consensus emerged quite rapidly among major interest groups such as 
employer and employee organizations, the financial industry and pensioner organizations, on 
both the problem description and the central policy measures. Although the major employee 
organization, the Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions (LO), at first was quite critical, it 
faced a solid majority consensus and therefore, changed its focus towards trying to influence 
specific reform elements to improve distributive outcomes. 
In subsequent parliamentary debates, political parties presented themselves to the 
general public as responsible guardians of their voters´ interests, justifying why they 
supported (or not) reform. It is thus fair to say that, in line with Schmidt’s approach, white 
papers contributed more to “building agreement on a policy programme among policy actors 
central to the policy process” (Schmidt 2000: 288) while parliamentary debates represented an 
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effort to ‘frame’ a consensual co-ordinative approach and “communicate it successfully to the 
public at large” (Schmidt 2000: 288).  
The importance of achieving consensus in the face of potential controversy is perhaps 
best illustrated by MP Jensen, Progress party, in her critical statement during the first 
parliamentary debate: “But I think this so-called robust system will be put to the test in the 
years to come, not least when the pensioners become aware of what the majority has 
supported” (St.forh., 2005: 2356). The detailed and comprehensive nature of the white paper, 
presenting a thorough review of the work of the pension commission, supported by the views 
expressed by different stakeholders, meant that there was an ‘epistemic community’ 
(Schmidt, 2000:286) the effect of which was to overcome dissent and help convince the 
general public of the benefits of the reforms.  The effect of this epistemic community belied 
the fact that the implications of the proposals were less evident to non-experts, and 
specifically to those negatively affected by the reforms in the longer term. 
Thus it was that a main theme of ‘security’ in the 2004 white paper (St.meld. nr 12, 
2004-2005) was closely linked to sustainability in documents and subsequent debates (see 
Figures 2 and 3), suggesting a secure and sustainable pension system would provide future 
pensioners with solid and reliable pensions. MP Duesund, Christian Democrats, stated that 
“We establish security in executing a pension reform. (…) My point of departure is that we 
must establish a system that is stable over time” (St. forh., 2005: 2386).  Parliamentary 
debate (St. forh., 2005) went so far as to suggest the white paper reforms were an 
improvement, adding to the notion of security in retirement (see Figure 3). Some MPs 
referred to specific improvements in the system; others to how the reforms in general 
represented improvement and not severe cutbacks. An illustration of this last point is the 
statement by Frøiland, Labour; “You cannot say that pension benefits are cut, but that there is 
less growth in some pension benefits” (St.forh., 2005: 2354). Likewise, the idea of a “little 
less more” was emphasised by several MPs (e.g. St. forh., 2005: 2367, 2370, 2379, 2383, 
2387), arguing that people should not think of the reform as reducing pension benefits. In 
other fora, the former Prime Minister Stoltenberg portrayed state pensions as an elevator 
which, even though it does not necessarily take you to the top floor, brings you a good 
retirement income that should not be considered any less valuable than today´s pension 
benefits.   
Several MPs also argued the reforms increased fairness (see Figure 3) by correcting 
existing injustices, e.g. how people with long working careers in the old system ended up with 
a very limited pension (St. forh., 2005: 2366). Intergenerational fairness was also highlighted 
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by the then finance minister Foss: “Today´s winners are those with no right to vote” (St. 
forhandl. 2005: 2364). Høybråten, Christian Democrats, exemplified the flexibility and 
freedom of choice argument, suggesting that: “More individual flexibility to choose the timing 
and degree of retirement is a large welfare improvement” (St. forh., 2005: 2382).  
The second white paper (St.meld. nr 5, 2006-2007), on which the second 
parliamentary debate was based, was similar in tone to the first. As highlighted by Figure 3, 
the arguments in the second parliamentary debate were also similar to the ones in 2005 
(St.forh., 2007), although the importance of choice (seen as improvement) is more apparent in 
the second parliamentary debate compared to the second white paper. 
UK - the ideational and interactive dimensions 
Background Context 
At a time of gradually declining occupational pension scheme membership (Pensions 
Commission, 2004:81), the (then) new Labour government moved away from Conservative 
policies of the early- to mid-1990s and attempted to create a ‘Partnership in Pensions’ 
(Department for Social Security, 1998). For those with no pension provision above the basic 
state pension, the state would provide a means-tested minimum income guarantee (1998:3). A 
new, simplified and easily accessible private ‘stakeholder’ pension would encourage 
individuals to supplement the state pension by making greater private saving, thereby 
ensuring fewer had to rely on means-tested benefits.  
Yet, that ‘partnership’ failed to achieve its objectives (Association of British Insurers, 
2003; Barr & Diamond, 2010:163). Cognitively, the benefit of saving using stakeholder 
pensions was difficult to assess for low income individuals due to the complex interaction of 
state pension and means-tested benefits with private savings (Rake et al 1999) (thus also 
hampering the communicative element of the discourse). The lack of employer contribution to 
the stakeholder pension also made it unattractive, and the financial services sector also 
remained unconvinced about its viability (Association of British Insurers, 2003). In Schmidt’s 
terms, the ideational and interactive dimensions of discourse were deficient, resulting in the 
failure to create an ‘epistemic community’ (Schmidt, 2000: 286) that might frame and 
construct a consensus (the co-ordinative element of discourse) to successfully implement 
these reforms.  
The 2004 Pensions Commission and 2006 White Paper  
In the wake of this failure, and with further significant declines in occupational pension 
scheme membership (Maer and Thurley, 2009) creating increased pressure on the provision of 
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means-tested benefits, the subsequent creation of a high-profile independent Pensions 
Commission was seen as a means of ‘re-booting’ attempts to create a broad consensus on 
pension reform (Department for Work and Pensions, 2002: 30-31). Made up of three key 
members - a business, a union and an academic representative - and supported by 
government, it brought together the key interests in UK policy-making. Producing three 
reports (Pensions Commission, 2004, 2005, 2006), it undertook widespread consultation on 
its ideas by instigating a ‘National Pensions Debate’ which ‘toured’ the country. This was 
characterised as a “dialogue with the public” (Department for Work and Pensions, 2005a, 




The Commission’s remit considered state pension issues insofar as they impacted on private 
savings (Institute for Government, 2010: 3). Early on, there appears to have been an 
acceptance of the inevitability of a reduced/limited role for state provision (Pensions 
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Commission, 2004: x, xii, 57, 58, 74) in the face of issues of sustainability (see Figure 4). 
This facilitated the ‘settling’ of a policy framing the adequacy of both state and private 
provision, as well as the affordability of state provision. Whilst subsequent feedback from the 
‘national debate’ did not always align with the Commission’s suggestions, there was 
sufficient public and industry support to enable the implementation of the government’s 
subsequent proposals (Bridgen and Meyer, 2018). The Commission provided government 
with a clearly argued policy framework (Schmidt’s ideational function); and, the 
representation of key interests on the Commission, supported by a national pensions debate, 
was an effective approach to convince the public at large of the merits of the policy 
(Schmidt’s interactive dimension).  The government had learned lessons from its previous 
attempt at pensions reform.  
  
Drawing upon the Commission’s report (see Figure 4), the result was the 2006 White 
Paper ‘Security in retirement: towards a new pension system’ (Department for Work and 
Pensions, 2006). The White Paper set out a number of principles or ‘tests’ for any new 
reforms – explicitly addressing the normative element in Schmidt’s ideational dimension of 
discourse. The first principle, personal responsibility, was, following Schmidt, cognitively 
supported by evidence in the findings of the first report of the Pensions Commission of failing 
pension schemes and a lack of private saving.  
The White Paper also included ‘sustainability’ as a principle of reform, and the 
affordability of state provision was clearly embedded in the notion of fiscal sustainability. 
Cognitive arguments drawing upon ‘sustainability’ and ‘affordability’ supported calls for 
greater personal responsibility (see Figure 4) creating a more integrated ideational discursive 
framework. These normative appeals were cognitively supported by evidence and argument 
aimed at increasing the state pension age. 
The principles in the White Paper also incorporated simplicity and fairness (see Figure 
4). The government wanted to remove the complexity of means-testing to make clear to 
individuals the benefits to be derived from saving, as well as increasing the basic state 
pension to reduce reliance of the poorest on means-tested benefits. Ideationally, it addressed 
the cognitive element of discourse whilst appealing to the norms of simplicity and fairness. 
Significantly, the White Paper introduced the metaphor of the state pension as a 
‘foundation’ for retirement (again, see Figure 4). The commitment to increase the basic state 
pension in line with earnings and alter the earnings-related second state pension to a flat rate 
benefit over a long transition period was portrayed as providing “a foundation for all upon 
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which to plan for their retirement” (Department for Work and Pensions, 2006:103). As Berry 
points out (2016: 16): 
 
… by redefining the purpose of the state pension as enabling private retirement saving 
by individuals, the reform represents a subtle form of welfare retrenchment through 
which the state withdraws from any attempt to provide a genuine income-replacement 
benefit for pensioners. 
 
It proposed that this private saving be facilitated by automatic enrolment of all employees into 
a workplace pension arrangement to which both employers and employees would be obliged 
to make a minimum level of contribution. 
 
Cognitively, a flat rate of state provision (albeit made of separate basic state and additional 
second pension, both based on National Insurance contribution record) could be presented as 
underpinning the reforms’ normative notion of simplicity, whilst its lack of generosity drew 
attention to the importance of individual responsibility for private pensions. Individual 
responsibility would be ‘facilitated’ by the automatic enrolment of employees, in turn 
becoming contributing members without the need to take any positive action.  At the same 
time, these reforms provided employers with the opportunity to move from more expensive 
benefit provision to making lower levels of benefit provision which nevertheless met the 
minimum employer contributions required under automatic enrolment (Johnson et al., 2010). 
It has been argued that this is the context within which employers and industry were able to 
support such reforms (Bridgen and Meyer, 2018). 
In Schmidt’s terms, a core set of (normative) principles aligned with consistent 
(cognitive) arguments were employed in a “recasting of the discourse and its policy 
paradigm” (Schmidt, 2000: 282) to convince the public of the soundness of these reforms.  
The 2010 Coalition government 
In 2011, in the aftermath of the financial crisis, and before these reforms could be fully 
implemented, a new coalition government consulted on further changes to state pension 
provision, (Department for Work and Pensions, 2011: 7-8) setting out principles of reform 
almost identical to those the Labour Government had set out in 2006, except that affordability 
and sustainability were merged in a single principle. This was no random conjuncture; 
framing affordability in the context of sustainability alluded to the broader fiscal prudence 
and ‘austerity’ agenda of the Coalition. Likewise, (re-)adopting these principles enabled the 
coalition to draw upon the discursive repertoire of the previous government’s reforms, 
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including that of the state pension as a ‘foundation’ for private provision (see also Berry, 
2016). The significance of this approach is apparent in the textual analysis of the Coalition’s 




Firstly, it proposed speeding up the move to a flat rate of state provision, but this time 
as a single state pension set just above the level of means-tested benefits. The Coalition 
emphasised simplicity in provision, enabling individuals to take greater responsibility for their 
retirement, and the importance of providing “a firmer foundation for saving” (Department for 
Work and Pensions, 2011: 37). Communicatively, the idea of a simplified structure could be 
conveyed easily and clearly.  In addition, the reforms were convincingly portrayed as an 
improvement, in so far as they increased the level of the basic rate pension, reduced means-
testing, and resulted in higher state pensions for those about to retire than they would have 
received under the system being replaced. Nevertheless, this belied a significant decrease in 
overall state pension entitlement for younger generations as a result of removing the 
opportunity to accrue state second pension (Pensions Policy Institute, 2014). 
 Secondly, again incorporating already established discursive elements, the notion of 
fairness signalled the needs of the vulnerable would be addressed (Department for Work and 
Pensions, 2011: 8 and 33), but in a way that also addressed the unfairness of intergenerational 
transfers (Department for Work and Pensions, 2011:8,11,41,45; and see Figure 5). By 
retaining (and increasing) the contributory requirement to qualify for state pension as of right, 
and by incorporating the notion of ‘contribution’ within a discourse that also emphasised the 
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costs of state benefits, the notion of fairness thus included the need to address sustainability 
through enhanced personal responsibility.  
 The state now positioned itself as the facilitator, or enabler - a significantly different 
obligation to that of ‘partner’ contained in the 1998 ‘Contract for Welfare’. There was much 
less emphasis on adequacy even compared to the 2006 proposals, and a much greater 
emphasis on personal responsibility (contrast Figures 4 and 5). As the Coalition pointed out: 
 
Pension Credit is an effective safety net in helping to keep today’s pensioners out of 
poverty. However, we are interested in views as to whether a continuation of the 
current system of Pension Credit for future pensioners would help achieve the 
Government’s principles of a state pensions system that is simple, fair, promotes 
personal responsibility, and is affordable and sustainable. Any reforms would need to 
be delivered without increasing public spending in any year (Department for Work and 
Pensions, 2011: 40). 
 
These reforms (finally enacted in 2016) illustrate Schmidt’s ideational and interactive 
elements of discourse. Not only did they ‘hail back’ to the legacy of the Beveridge Report 
(what Schmidt would refer to as “taking the shards of past communal memories and 
understandings and reweaving them” (2000: 281)). they also built upon the ‘epistemic 
community’ developed by the Pensions Commission and the previous Labour government. As 
Figures 4 and 5 suggest, the discursive elements deployed in 2004-6, and again in 2010-13, 
successfully established the 2016 reforms as a ‘foundation’ for responsible private retirement, 
as opposed to a ‘foundation’ for security in retirement.  
 
Table 5 summarizes the Norwegian and UK pensions reform discourse: 
 
Table 5. Dimensions and functions of discourse  
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6. Discussion and Conclusion 
Whilst Norway and the UK embarked upon reforms from very different positions (European 
Commission, 2012; OECD, 2012), they have both attempted to limit the role of the state in 
pension provision. Using the framework provided by Schmidt, our study illustrates the 
importance of discourse to both the depiction, and implementation, of such reforms. 
 Firstly, we find that both countries adopted a very similar approach in implementing 
reform, specifically using similar ‘building blocks’ (following Schmidt’s ideational dimension 
of discourse) in addressing the reasons for, and legitimacy of, their respective policy 
programmes. Firstly, sustainability (of national finances) is a key cognitive motif in both sets 
of reforms. In the UK this is further underpinned by emphasising affordability (for 
government). 
Secondly, the notions of fairness (UK) and generational distribution (Norway) are 
both used to establish (cognitively) a particular understanding of the implications of longevity 
for benefit costs, as well as to more explicitly linking contributions and benefits. Normatively, 
fairness demands less redistribution, both intragenerationally and intergenerationally, of the 
cost of state pensions. This enabled both governments to emphasise individual effort in 
making retirement provision. In the UK this has been an integral part of pensions discourse 
for a significant time, and the emphasis upon issues of choice and flexibility in Norwegian 
reforms suggests the increased significance of a similar narrative, placing greater emphasis on 
the ‘choice’ of individuals to continue in work or not. 
Notwithstanding very different welfare traditions, Norway and the UK have imbued 
the notions of fairness and responsibility with very specific implications for the state’s, and 
individuals’, choices and responsibilities. The fall out of the great financial crisis has only 
served to reinforce this logic (Goul Andersen, Schoyen and Hvinden 2017), and it is reflected 
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in discussion concerning reform across Europe (see, for example, European Commission, 
2012). Thus, pension discourse in the two countries are more similar in this respect than 
should be expected based on the approach of Schmidt (2000). 
As regards the interactive dimension of discourse there are perhaps more differences, 
although again parallels can be drawn. In Norway, appeals for consensus on the reforms 
amongst the general public were, most visible in our data through the medium of the two key 
parliamentary debates on the reforms. In terms of the ideational dimension of the reform 
discourse, politicians appealed to notions of justice and security. These are notions which 
would traditionally be taken to be at the heart of a welfare state regime. Such parliamentary 
appeals may have been more significant given that these notions are much less evident in the 
reform documents themselves. 
In the UK, having failed to achieve ‘buy in’ for the successful implementation of the 
1998 reforms, the government thereafter appears to have been much more attuned to 
importance of both the ideational and interactive functions of discourse. At an interactive 
level, it sought support from the financial services sector, unions and employers co-
ordinatively through the composition and work of the Pensions Commission, whose three 
reports established the basis for an epistemic community to coalesce around reforms.  Equally 
the ‘National Pensions Debate’ provided a vehicle by which it could, with more or less 
justification, point to public support for the general thrust of its reforms – addressing both the 
co-ordinative and communicative elements of discourse. The lesson for Norway may be that 
in seeking further individualisation in pension provision, in future it may need to do much 
more in terms of the external transmission of its policy paradigm and programme. 
This last point draws attention to one further parallel between the UK and Norway that 
arises from this discussion. If, paradigmatically, both sets of recent reforms can be said to be 
concerned with re-aligning the role of the state and the individual, then it is interesting to note 
the metaphors used by the respective governments to characterise state pension reform. In 
Norway, use of the metaphor of an elevator, taking someone up (as opposed to down) is both 
positive and enabling. In the UK, by contrast, the use of the term ‘foundation’ in relation to 
the unified state pension suggests something enabling, but at the time aligns with the more 
basic aspirations for state pension in the UK, and marks the demarcation of responsibilities 
for retirement between the state and its citizens. In both cases, savers/retirees are supported 
and helped by the state, but each metaphor portrays a different degree of assistance more 
attuned to the welfare traditions of each country drawn upon in arguing for these reforms. 
Nevertheless, both are underpinned by a similar repertoire of discursive elements to create, in 
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each case, a coordinative common language that is able to convincingly present each 
government’s policy programme as an ‘improvement’ in state provision in the face of reduced 
spending. 
The use of metaphors may have an added significance. In both countries they appear 
to have enabled reformers, in engaging with the ideational element of discourse, to provide a 
convincing narrative for the public, founded in the country’s welfare traditions, without 
necessarily requiring public engagement with the corpus of technical and complex detail also 
necessary to form an epistemic community for the reforms.   
In conclusion, our analysis suggests that, no matter their domestic welfare and 
democratic traditions, nation states addressing issues of state pension spending are likely to 
employ similar discursive elements in persuading their population about the logic and 
rationality of their reforms. These discursive elements are also likely to be imbued with a 
financialised and individualising logic. The analysis also indicates the importance of the 
discourse being supported by a significant body of research that is capable of enlisting the 
‘epistemic community’ needed to drive through the reforms in the face of any criticism. 
That said, our analysis also draws attention to the importance of communicative 
aspects of discourse in the success of any reforms.  It suggests that in communicating reforms, 
successful governments weave ‘shards of the [national and collective] past’ in their narrative.  
At the same time, in the face of inevitable complexity, they may adopt metaphors to ‘make 
sense’ of the reforms in the context of collective welfare traditions and to galvanise support 
for acceptance of reforms. 
Our analysis provides lessons for both governments and policy reform groups. In the 
face of national differences, it points to commonalities of approach in implementing welfare 
policy reform across nation states in the context of increased financial pressures. It also 
highlights how this approach needs to reflect the particular characteristics of that nation and 
its welfare traditions. In addition, the analysis provides a potential template for analysing 
further welfare policy changes that may occur in the context of addressing government 
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